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International Scope of Fourth Amendment Protections:
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
[We] also must take great pains to ensure that the Constitution
does not become the first casualty in the "War on Drugs."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the United States declared a "war on drugs," the gov-
ernment has tried to eradicate drugs at their source. Most drugs found
in the United States, however, have their source in other countries.
Thus, United States law enforcement has taken on a vast international
scope. These international law enforcement efforts have caused the United
States courts to struggle with questions of when and to whom the Fourth
Amendment 2 to the United States Constitution will apply. Recent de-
cisions of the Supreme Court have put the fourth amendment, which
grants protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, in jeopardy.
On February 28, 1990, the United States Supreme Court handed down
the most aggressive decision to date on the subject of fourth amendment
application. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (hereinafter Verdugo),
the Supreme Court reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit4 and held that the fourth amendment does not apply to
the search and seizure, by United States agents, of property that is
owned by a non-resident alien and located in a foreign country., This
decision is more important, however, because it gives radical implications
of suppression of fourth amendment rights in other circumstances as
well.
This casenote will begin with some background information on
United States law enforcement efforts in Mexico which preceded the
Verdugo decision. It will attempt to illustrate some of the problems and
Copyright 1991, by LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW.
1. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 1988).
2. U.S. Const. amend. IV reads as follows: "[tihe right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."
3. 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
4. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth
Circuit held that protection of the fourth amendment extended to the government's search
of Verdugo's Mexican residence.
5. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1059.
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uncertainties associated with international law enforcement efforts through
exploration of the Verdugo decision at both the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court level. This casenote will attempt to give the reader a
brief synopsis of under what circumstances the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution applies, and reasons why the Verdugo
decision leaves application of the fourth amendment vulnerable to attack
in many circumstances.
A. Background Facts Leading up to the Verdugo Decision: The
Camarena Murder
Enrique ("Kiki") Camarena was a special agent of the United States
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) who was assigned in 1980 to
the DEA office located in Guadalajara, Mexico. His mission for the
next several years was two-fold: to locate and bring to justice Mexico's
most notorious marijuana and cocaine barons, and, more importantly,
to produce evidence for the Reagan administration linking Mexico's
multi-billion dollar drug pipeline to the highest ranking Mexican army,
police, and government officials. 6 Upon arriving in Mexico, Camarena
learned quickly that the corruption of Mexican officials surpassed his
wildest imaginations. The situation in which Camarena became most
involved was one which involved an accusation against the Mexican
Attorney General's office of sabotaging the aerial spraying program,
which the United States State Department was funding, and pocketing
the bulk of the ten million dollars that the United States provided
toward the program each year.7 Through informants' tips, Camarena
and his colleagues became aware that the Mexican drug barons were
producing high grade marijuana in Mexico's desert by irrigation methods
from underground wells. Agents knew that if these "marijuana plan-
tations" existed in the quantities claimed, they would serve as sound
proof that Mexican officials were not complying with the aerial spraying
operations agreement.' In May of 1982, DEA agents, along with Mexican
police and an air force of seven helicopters, set out on a search and
destroy mission. About twenty miles into the desert, the marijuana forest
came into sight. Some 220 acres were cultivated in some of the highest
grade marijuana ever seized, with plant stalks five feet high. In sum,
this raid netted 5,000 tons of marijuana.9 The next raid netted twenty
6. Shannon, Desperados, Time, Nov. 7, 1988. at 84.
7. Id. at 87.
8. The Mexican government could not claim that it overlooked the emerald green
foliage in an open desert; it could be seen from the air miles away.
9. Drug Enforcement Administration Reauthorization for Fiscal Year 1986: Hearings
-before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1985).
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tons. The most astonishing raid of all, however, occurred in November
of 1984, when 10,000 tons of marijuana were seized from a Mexican
desert plantation. The amount of marijuana seized can be appreciated
when one notes that United States analysts in 1983 concluded that only
12,000 to 15,000 tons of marijuana were used in the United States that
year."0
Camarena's identity became known to the drug barons who owned
the marijuana plantations. On February 7, 1985, Special Agent Camarena
was abducted by Mexican Federal Judicial Police Officers and brought
to the ranch of Caro-Quintero, a major Mexican drug trafficker. Wit-
nesses, who have since testified in United States prosecutions, claim
Camarena was "brutally beaten and kicked around for hours,"" and
then ordered killed by Quintero, with the consent of other drug lords,
including Matta-Ballesteros and Verdugo-Urquidez. Camarena's body was
found on the side of a dirt road about sixty miles out of Guadalajara.
Doctors performing an autopsy on the body revealed several broken
ribs, a large number of lacerations, a crushed skull, and the possibility
that the victim had been buried alive.' 2 The DEA officials were further
distraught when Quintero, who was then known to have been involved
in the murder, was protected from DEA officials by the Mexican Federal
Judicial Police. He was allowed to leave in his private jet from Guad-
alajara Airport while DEA officials watched in dismay.
In connection with the Camarena murder, United States courts handed
down twenty-two indictments. 3 Of the twenty-two people indicted for
the murder and related crimes, seven have been brought to the United
States to stand trial. Of these seven, three were brought before the same
United States District Court by means of covert forcible abduction from
their homeland: Verdugo-Urquidez, Matta-Ballesteros, and Caro-Quin-
tero. 4 Although abduction may seem barbaric, one must realize that
10. Shannon, supra note 6, at 88.
I. United States-Mexican Cooperation in Narcotics Control Efforts: Hearings before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
- 12. Drug Enforcement Administration Reauthorization for Fiscal Year 1986, supra
note 9, at 26.
13. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990). It is also
interesting to note that these indictments from the Camarena murder included such Mexican
officials as two police officers, the brother-in-law of the former Mexican president, the
ex-director of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police, and the Commander of the Mexican
Anti-Drug Unit who was also head of the Mexican Bar Association.
14. Verdugo-Urquidez was apprehended by Mexican police officers at the request of
United States Marshals. However, his abduction was unknown to the Mexican Police
officials, and in fact, the officers who kidnapped Verdugo for the U. S. Marshals were
imprisoned by Mexican officials upon their return. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988).
Matta-Ballesteros was apprehended in Honduras by a special force of Honduran troops
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Camarena was murdered because he found evidence linking Mexico's
highest government officials to these drug barons (now accused mur-
derers). Thus, as one might expect, Mexican officials did not cooperate
in extradition proceedings.
B. Cases Resulting from the Camarena Murder
The three cases involving the abduction of criminal defendants out-
side the United States who were brought back to the United States to
stand trial raise very interesting fourth amendment questions, and, in
fact, were all argued on different grounds. 5 However, since only one,
Verdugo, has reached the Supreme Court, the remainder of this casenote
will focus on its holding that the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution does not apply to the search and seizure of non-
resident aliens outside of United States territories.', The Verdugo holding
must be analyzed in light of the fact that this case came about as the
result of the torture/murder of a United States law enforcement officer
in the line of duty. One must delve into the realm of reality and realize
that even the United States Supreme Court is literally "only human."
Such emotional facts from such a widely publicized case must lead one
to at least speculate that the Verdugo holding was more inclined to be
righteous than right.
led by four U. S. Marshals. He was handcuffed, blindfolded, driven immediately to a
U. S. Air Force Base, and flown to the United States. Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896
F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990).
Caro-Quintero was the subject of several extradition attempts by United States officials.
However, Mexican officials required a $50,000 transport fee for his custody. When the
U. S. refused to pay the sum, Mexico refused to extradite Quintero. The DEA then
authorized a reward for Quintero's capture and delivery to the U. S.-Mexico border.
Mexican bounty hunters then abducted Quintero at his office at gunpoint and immediately
drove him to the border. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 599.
15. Matta-Ballesteros argued that he fell under the Toscanino exception to the Ker-
Frisbee Rule. The Ker-Frisbee Rule is that the defendant himself may not be suppressed
as the result of an illegal search or seizure. The Toscanino exception holds that if the
defendant has been brought before the court "as a result of the Government's deliberate,
unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional rights," the court
is required to divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (United States
v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974)). The Matta-Ballesteros court, however,
held that the facts of this case did not reach the level of Toscanino. Matta-Ballesteros,
896 F.2d at 261.
Verdugo-Urquidez, as this note will explore, argued that his fourth amendment rights
were violated by the unlawful search of his house in Mexico; thus, he contended that
the evidence against him should be excluded.
Caro-Quintero was obviously the most liked abductee by the Mexican government,
because they raised two official protests to his abduction. This change of facts allowed
Quintero to argue treaty violation. This argument was successful at the district court level
and they ordered his return to Mexico in an attempt to "right the wrong" of the treaty
violation. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 599.
16. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
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in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the subject of this casenote,
the respondent did not claim a fourth amendment violation because of
an illegal seizure of his person, as was unsuccessfully tried by co-
defendant Matta-Ballesteros prior to Verdugo's hearing.' 7 Rather, Ver-
dugo claimed his fourth amendment rights were violated by an illegal
search and seizure of his Mexican residence after he was abducted and
brought to the United States to stand trial.' 8 He thus attempted to have
the bulk of the evidence against him suppressed. As will be discussed,
the Supreme Court in Verdugo held that an alien has no fourth amend-
ment protections from search and seizure outside the United States
territories. Thus, his conviction, as that of Matta-Ballesteros, remained
in effect.
II. THE VERDUOO-URQUIDEZ DECISION
Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was indicted by the United States
for drug trafficking and for the murder of Camarena Salazar, a United
States DEA agent, in Mexico. The problem was that Verdugo-Urquidez
was a Mexican citizen residing in Mexico. Extradition attempts failed
because Mexico's extradition treaty with the United States did not require
Mexico to extradite its own nationals.' 9 Although the treaty provided
that Mexico could extradite a national if it deemed it proper to do so,
the Mexican law prohibits such extradition of nationals. Thus, the DEA
arranged for six Mexican police officers to forcibly abduct Verdugo-
Urquidez and bring him to the Mexico-United States border to be arrested
by waiting United States Marshals.20 Thereafter, while Verdugo-Urquidez
was incarcerated in the United States pending trial, four DEA agents,
with the assistance of several officers of the Mexican Federal Judicial
Police, conducted a search of Verdugo's residence in which incriminating
evidence was obtained. Although Mexican police were present at the
search, the United States officials initiated it and conducted it at their
discretion; thus, it was considered a joint venture and the fact that it
was a United.States search was not contested. 2'
At notime prior to the search did the DEA seek or receive approval
from the Justice Department or an American magistrate to conduct the
17. See supra note 15.
18. Verdugo-Urquidez. 110 S. Ct. at 1060.
19. Mexico Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978-Feb. 6, 1980, United States-Mexico, Art.
9(1), 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656.
20. See supra note 14.
21. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1227 (9th Cir. 1988). ("(Gliven
the high degree of American involvement in the searches and the low degree of Mexican
interest in Verdugo-Urquidez, we do not even find the question [of whether this is an
American search] a close one.").
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search." No search warrant was obtained, nor were there exigent cir-
cumstances to justify the search. Thus, when Verdugo moved to suppress
the evidence obtained in the search because his fourth amendment rights
had been violated, the Court was squarely faced with the issue of whether
Verdugo, a non-resident alien, was afforded fourth amendment protec-
tions outside of United States territories. If Verdugo was found to be
protected by the fourth amendment, clearly a violation had occurred
and the evidence against him would probably be suppressed under the
Mapp v. Ohio3 exclusionary rule. However, if Verdugo had no fourth
amendment rights because of his status as a non-resident alien, then
obviously no fourth amendment violation could have occurred and his
conviction would be affirmed.
A. The Court of Appeals Decision
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the District Court's holding that Verdugo-Urquidez had fourth amend-
ment rights, that these rights were in fact violated, and that therefore
evidence therefrom must be suppressed.2 4 The Court of Appeals analysis
in Verdugo concentrated on discrediting use of the Social Compact
Theory in this case. The Social Compact Theory25 regards the Consti-
tution as a contract between the government of the United States and
its citizens. This theory supposes that only those who are given rights
in the contract can invoke them.
A reading of each amendment provides who is afforded rights under
that amendment. The fourth amendment, for example, provides its pro-
tection to "the people." ' 26 Therefore, only "the people" who participate
in the contract, United States citizens, can invoke its protections. On
the other hand, the fifth amendment provides its protections to a "per-
son."'" By using the word "person," Social Compact theorists claim
that fifth amendment protections are offered to anyone who wishes to
invoke them.
22. Id. at 1216 n.2.
23. 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961). (Violations of the fourth amendment require
that evidence illegally obtained be excluded from both state and federal trials.).
24. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1215.
25. For a discussion of the Compact theory in the context of the fourth amendment,
see Note, The Extraterritorial Applicability of the Fourth Amendment, 102 Harv. L. Rev.
1672, 1674-79 (1989).
26. U.S. Const. amend. IV, supra note 2 ("Itlhe right of the people to be secure ...
(emphasis added).
27. U.S. Const. amend. V reads in pertinent part: "[nlo person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury .. . nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb." (emphasis added).
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The Supreme Court has consistently used the Social Compact Theory
in its decisions regarding extra-territorial application of the Constitu-
tion. 21 In rejecting the Social Compact Theory in this case, the court
of appeals stated that "we are not persuaded that the Compact Theory
is a legitimate mode for applying the Constitution in this case." 29 The
court did have to concede, however, that "this Compact Theory of the
Constitution has deep roots in our nation's history," 30 but the court
said, in its own defense, that use of the Social Compact Theory in past
Constitutional interpretation cases has been primarily in the realm of
federalism, not in extra-territorial application of Constitutional protec-
tions.3"
After discrediting use of the Compact Theory, the court attempted
to find support for its use of the Natural Rights Theory 2 to explain
the rights of aliens abroad." The Natural Rights Theory looks upon
the Constitution as a constraint on United States activities anywhere.
The Natural Rights Theory views the protections of the Constitution as
limits on the actor, whereas the Social Compact Theory views the
protections of the Constitution as rights given to victims. In short, the
Natural Rights Theory "posits that the Constitution inherently constrains
the acts of United States officials, regardless of locale. ' 34 Thus, this
view potentially allows Constitutional protections to be invoked by an-
yone, anywhere.
Although the Natural Rights Theory is popular among commenta-
tors, it is nonetheless rarely used by courts in cases involving the extra-
territorial applicability of the Constitution." However, the court of
appeals cited commentators who favor broad Constitutional interpre-
28. See the language of the Court in United States ex rel. Turner. v. Williams, 194
U.S. 279, 292, 24 S. Ct. 719, 723 (1904). (An excludable alien is not entitled to first
amendment rights because the first amendment protects "the people," and an excludable
alien "does not become one of the people to whom these things are secured by our
Constitution."). See also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1061 (1990).
"The available historical data shows, therefore, that the purpose of the fourth amendment
was to protect the people .... "
29. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir. 1988).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1220-21.
32. For a more specific discussion of the Natural Rights Theory, see Note, The
Extraterritorial Application of the Constitution-Unalienable Rights? 72 Va. L. Rev. 649
(1986). See also Note, The Extraterritorial Applicability of the Fourth Amendment, 102
Harv. L. Rev. 1672 (1989). (This article refers to the Natural Rights Theory as the
"Organic Perspective.").
33. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1219-1224.
34. Note, supra note 25, at 1675 (emphasis added).
35. See Saltzburg, The Reach of the Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra Firma of the
United States, 20 Va. J. Int'l L. 741 (1980); Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug
Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 Hastings L.J. 889 (1987).
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tation to support its use of the Natural Rights Theory. 6 The court,
trying to find precedential support for the Natural Rights Theory, cited /
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza17 for the prop-
osition that illegal aliens in this country have fourth amendment rights.
The court held it would thus be illogical to grant one who is in this
country voluntarily but illegally fourth amendment rights, and not grant
Verdugo, who is here involuntarily, but legally, these same protections."
The court then concluded that Verdugo-Urquidez must have fourth
amendment protections and that they were violated.
The court of appeals dissent by Judge Wallace focused on use of
the Social Compact Theory.39 He cited early Constitutional writers, as
well as the Preamble to the Constitution,4 to support his view. The
dissent also stated that Verdugo's brief involuntary presence in the United
States, which consisted of incarceration while awaiting trial, did not
entitle him to the rights of an alien located in this country, whatever
those rights may be, but rather his rights must be determined as if he
were present in Mexico, 4 a point which the Supreme Court majority
addressed in its reversal of the court of appeals.
Finally, Wallace blasted the majority opinion for ignoring the lan-
guage in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation,42 which
says that the Constitution has no force in foreign territory, except with
respect to American citizens. Further, Wallace said that even without
the language in Curtiss-Wright, it would be difficult to accept the
majority's illogical position in the absence of "compelling precedence
or sound reasoning. The majority, [according to Wallace] provides us
with neither. '43
36. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1219-20 (9th Cir. 1988).
37. 468 U.S. 1032, 1050, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 3489 (1984). The Court denied an illegal
alien fourth amendment rights in the context of a deportation hearing. However, at the
end of its opinion, the Lopez-Mendoza court gave us language which was thought to
mean that aliens located in the United States have fourth amendment protections. The
Court said:
We do not condone any violations of the Fourth Amendment that may have
occurred in the arrests of respondents .... Our conclusions concerning the
exclusionary rule's value might change if there developed good reason to believe
that Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were widespread.
38. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1222-23.
39. Id. at 1231 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
40. U.S. Const. Preamble reads as follows: "[w]e the People of the United States,
in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for
the United States of America." (emphasis added).
41. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1238 (9th Cir. 1988).
42. 299 U.S. 304, 318, 57 S. Ct. 216, 220 (1936). See infra text accompanying notes
101-02.
43. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1230.
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B. The Supreme Court Decision in Verdugo-Urquidez
In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and held that the
fourth amendment does not apply to the search and seizure by United
States agents of property that is owned by a non-resident alien and
located in a foreign country." The Supreme Court made several dis-
tinctions early in its opinion which are important to understand when
attempting to limit its decision. First, the Court noted that fourth
amendment violations differ from fifth and sixth amendment violations
in time and place of occurrence. A violation of the fourth amendment,
said the Court, is 'fully accomplished' at the time [and place] of an
unreasonable government intrusion,' '4 unlike violations of trial rights
guaranteed by the fifth and sixth amendments, which necessarily must
occur at the time and place of trial. Thus, in Verdugo, the fourth
amendment violation, if one occurred, occurred solely in Mexico. The
second preliminary distinction which the Court made involved its re-
minder that it was not deciding whether the evidence obtained in the
Mexican search should be excluded. That issue was not before the Court
and as such was not decided."
The Court began its analysis with a strong Social Compact Theory
element by going through a textual distinction of the amendments to
the Constitution. 47 The Court distinguished use of the words "the peo-
ple" in several amendments in conjunction with a definition of "the
people" as United States citizens in the Preamble of the Constitution
to support the Social Compact Theory of Constitutional interpretation.
The Court noted:
[WIhile this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests
that "the people" protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by
the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and
powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers
to a class of persons who are part of a national commu-
nity ....4
The Court then attempted to find precedential support for its decision
that the fourth amendment has no application to a non-resident alien.
They first cited cases which were the result of the United States naval
battle with France in 1798. 41 The issue in these cases was whether illegal
seizures took place when the United States seized French ships under
44. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1059 (1990).
45. Id. at 1060.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1060-61. "'The people' seems to have been a term of art employed in
select parts of the Constitution."
48. Id. at 1061.
49. Id. at 1062.
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authority of Congress. To support the Verdugo holding, the Court said
of these cases: "it was never suggested that the Fourth Amendment
restrained the authority of Congress or of United States agents to conduct
operations such as this." 50
The Court also cited the Insular Cases ' to support its decision. The
Insular Cases stand for the proposition that not every Constitutional
provision extends. everywhere that the United States exerts sovereign
power. The Chief Justice reasoned that since the Insular Cases held that
not all Constitutional protections extend to inhabitants of territories
governed by the United States, then even fewer Constitutional protections
will extend to aliens in foreign nations . 2 The Court also relied on
Johnson v. Eisentrager" for support. The Johnson case denied enemy
aliens, imprisoned in Germany by the United States, fifth amendment
rights. The Court reasoned here that the fifth amendment uses the general
word "person," and its use was denied to non-resident aliens; therefore,
the fourth amendment, which uses the words "the people," should a
fortiori be denied as well.' 4
The remainder of the Court's analysis cited a grocery list of cases
which provide resident aliens with first, fifth, sixth, and fourteenth
amendment protections," but not with fourth amendment protections.
The Court, however, held that Verdugo was a non-resident alien with
no previous significant voluntary connection with the United States;
thus, these cases were of no help to him. 6
In its conclusion, the Court paradoxically seemed to narrow its
holding to the facts of this case only, rather than to assert a broad
rule that the fourth amendment does not apply to non-resident aliens."
The Court held:
50. Id.
51. The Insular Cases are a group of early Supreme Court cases which refused to
provide Constitutional rights to residents of newly acquired United States territories; see
e.g., Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 42 S. Ct. 343 (1922) (sixth amendment right
to trial by jury denied in Puerto Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 34 S.
Ct. 712 (1914) (the Court refused fifth amendment rights in the Philippines); Dorr v.
United States, 195 U.S. 138, 24 S. Ct. 808 (1904) (sixth amendment right to jury trial
denied in Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 23 S. Ct. 787 (1903) (fifth
and sixth amendment rights denied in Hawaii); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 21 S.
Ct. 770 (1901) (Article I clauses inapplicable in Puerto Rico).
52. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1062 (1990).
53. 339 U.S. 763, 70 S. Ct. 936 (1950).
54. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1063.
55. Id. at 1064.
56. Id.
57. It seems odd that the Court wanted to narrow this decision to the facts only,
after it impliedly sounded a death knell to fourth amendment protections in other situations,
such as to Americans abroad and aliens here in the United States.
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At the time of the search, [Verdugo] was a citizen and resident
of Mexico with no voluntary attachment to the United States,
and the place searched was located in Mexico. Under these
circumstances, the Fourth Amendment has no application."
To correct this decision, if found to 6e unappealing, the Court suggests
that restrictions on American search and seizure activities be imposed
"by the political branches through diplomatic understanding, treaty, or
legislation."1 9
C. Dangerous Implications of the Court's Opinion
Throughout the opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist made statements
limiting cases which have granted Constitutional protections, resulting
in what seems to be a Territorial Social Impact Theory6 for the ap-
plication of the fourth amendment. He emphatically rejected respondent's
claim that Reid v. Covert6l can be interpreted to mean that the fourth
amendment constrains federal officials whenever and against whomever
they act. The Court said that "Reid stands for no such sweeping
proposition;" rather, it limits Reid to granting United States citizens
stationed abroad protection of the fifth and sixth amendments only.62
Further, the Court noted that Reid was only a plurality opinion
and that the two concurring Justices in Reid declined to hold that United
States citizens abroad are entitled to the full range of Constitutional
protections. Only after the Court limited Reid to granting only fifth
and sixth amendment protections to United States citizens abroad did
it say that Reid was of no help to Verdugo because he was not a United
States citizen.
The Court had no reason in this case to limit the holding of Reid
if it was going to distinguish the case on the facts anyway. Thus, the
Court seems to imply, or at least leaves open the question, that United
States citizens abroad may not always invoke the fourth amendment.
The Court similarly limited the holding of Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza .6 The Supreme Court held that the
court of appeals erred when it assumed that Lopez-Mendoza granted
58. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1066.
59. Id.
60. It is this writer's opinion that the only time one can be certain that the fourth
amendment will apply is when dealing with American citizens in the United States. Thus
a territorial Social Compact Theory results.
61. 354 U.S. i, 77 S. Ct. 1222 (1957). (The plurality court held that non-military
United States citizens, traveling abroad with military spouses, are entitled to fifth and
sixth amendment protections.).
62. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1063.
63. 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984). See also supra note 37.
19911 465
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fourth amendment protections to illegal aliens in the United States.6
The Court said that its decision in Lopez-Mendoza stands only for the
proposition that the "Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule should be
extended to deportation proceedings; it did not encompass whether the
protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to illegal aliens in this
country." 5 Then the Court noted that sometimes when deciding par-
ticular issues, it assumes antecedent propositions, which "even on ju-
risdictional issues, are not binding in future cases that directly raise the
questions."" Thus, the Court seems to imply, or at least leaves us with
the possibility that, illegal aliens in the United States may not have
fourth amendment protection.
D. Concurrence and Dissent
Justice Kennedy joined the opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist be-
cause he said that his views were fundamentally the same. However, he
wrote a concurring opinion in order to more thoroughly explain these
views which he concedes are very troublesome. I submit that Justice
Kennedy's views do not extend as far as Chief Justice Rehnquist's do.
Perhaps he tried, as Justice Harlan so eloquently did in United States
v. Katz,6 7 to give the Court's opinion a more acceptable basis.
First, Justice Kennedy did not agree with the majority's Social
Compact Theory. He said that the words "the people," as used in some
Constitutional amendments, create no restrictions as to applicability. He
would not allow such textual word choice to detract from the fourth
amendment's force or reach. Secondly, Justice Kennedy's opinion does
not hold that the fourth amendment does not apply to non-resident
aliens outside the United States, as Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion
does. Rather Justice Kennedy seems to hold that the warrant requirement
of the fourth amendment does not apply to the search of a non-resident's
foreign home. In Justice Kennedy's view, to force adherence to the
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment would be impracticable
and anomalous because no United States magistrate could issue a search
warrant which would be valid in Mexico. Thus, he concludes that "[llust
as the Constitution in the Insular Cases did not require Congress to
implement all constitutional guarantees in its territories ... the Con-
stitution does not require United States agents to obtain a warrant when
searching the foreign home of a non-resident alien." ' 68
64. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1064-65.
67. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967) (Justice Harlan's concurring opinion has
become the opinion most cited for the Katz holding.).
68. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1067 (1990).
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Although he joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion (along with
Justices White, Scalia, and O'Connor), Justice Kennedy's remarks do
not imply that he intends the fourth amendment to be inapplicable to
non-resident aliens. Moreover, I do not think that he would want to
leave the question of the applicability of the fourth amendment to
resident aliens and United States citizens abroad open for debate; which
is exactly what Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion does. In fact, Chief
Justice Rehnquist was appointed by President Nixon to help swing the
pendulum away from the protection of rights of the accused and toward
the power of the government. 69 In his view, any conflict between a
criminal defendant and the state should be resolved in favor of the
state. Although I agree that Chief Justice Rehnquist's intention is good,
I cannot agree with brushing aside basic Constitutional protections.
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens asserted that aliens lawfully in
the United States are protected by the Bill of Rights, including the
fourth amendment. He found that Verdugo fit into this category of
aliens lawfully in the United States, even though he was here against
his will. But Justice Stevens concurred in the result because he found
that the warrant clause can have no application in searches of non-
citizens' homes in foreign jurisdictions because United States magistrates
have no power to authorize such searches.10 Justice Stevens' opinion is
a more digestible remedy. He only suspends the warrant clause in ap-
propriate circumstances and his opinion does not give the impression
that fourth amendment protections are being smothered.
The dissent, authored by Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Mar-
shall joined, tried to salvage some remnants of protection for non-
resident aliens. In his eloquent style of writing, Justice Brennan tried
to form the plurality opinion into a "sufficient connection test" which
could guide lower courts in deciding when the fourth amendment pro-
tection should be afforded-to non-resident aliens .7 However, the Court
created no such test. Though Justice Rehnquist did hint that an alien's
significant connections with the United States may have an impact on
its decision, he never actually held such. But the dissent analyzed the
facts of Verdugo's case in light of the "sufficient connection test"
anyway and found that Verdugo had the most obvious connection with
the United States; he was investigated and prosecuted under United
States law. Thus, the dissent concluded that Verdugo had sufficient
69. S. Davis, Justice Rehnquist and the Constitution (1989).
70. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1068 (Stevens, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 1070 (Brennan' J., dissenting) ("The Court admits that 'the people' extends
beyond the citizenry, but leaves the precise contours of its 'sufficient connection' test
unclear." However, though mentioned in the plurality opinion, no sufficient connection
test was created.).
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connection with the United States to warrant his protection by the fourth
amendment.
In refuting the Court's theory that the phrase "the people" creates
a social compact, the dissent suggested that the words "the people" are
"better understood as a rhetorical counter-point to 'the government,,
such that rights that were reserved to 'the people' were to protect all
those subject to 'the government.'1 2 Further, the dissent noted that use
of the word "person" in the fourth amendment would have led to an
awkward sentence structure." It then concluded that such word choice
could not have had such significant implications.
The dissent then concluded with a fundamental fairness argument,
asserting that every person upon whom the United States exerts its law
must likewise be afforded its protection. Brennan wrote:
When we tell the world that we expect all people, wherever they
may be, to abide by our laws, we cannot in the same breath
tell the world that our law enforcement officers need not do
the same. 4
In short, the dissent found that the fourth amendment must govern
every action by United States officials that could be characterized as a
search or seizure.
III. CATEGORIZATION OF FOURTH AmNDMENT APPLICATION
A. Applicability of the Fourth Amendment to United States Citizens
in the United States
The fourth amendment purports to protect, among, other things,
"[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . ."" The right
which is afforded by the fourth amendment is clearly applicable to "the
people." In order to decipher exactly who the framers intended "the
people" to be, one can simply turn back to the Preamble of the
Constitution and read that "[w]e the people of the United States, in
Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice . . . do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."17 6
By reading the fourth amendment as protecting "the people," and
the Preamble's definition of "the people" as United States citizens,
neither the Social Compact theorists nor the Natural Rights theorists
72. Id. at 1072.
73. Id. at 1072 n.9 (1990) ("[tlhe Right of Persons to be secure in their person . ..
74. Id. at 1077.
75. U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added). See supra note 2.
76. U.S. Const. Preamble (emphasis added). See supra note 40.
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can deny that "the people" includes United States citizens located in
the United States. This fourth amendment application is obvious, and
United States courts have so held.77
B. Applicability of the Fourth Amendment to Aliens in the United
States
The more difficult question is whether "the people" includes aliens
present in United States territories, or, phrased differently, whether or
not the Constitution of the United States, especially the fourth amend-
ment, applies to aliens within the territory of the United States. The
older Supreme Court jurisprudence held some provisions of the Con-
stitution to be applicable to aliens in the United States.
The first and most cited case on this point is Yick Wo v. Hopkins,78
where the Supreme Court was faced with deciding if petitioner, a subject
of the Emperor of China who was now living in the United States, was
afforded the protection of the fourteenth amendment against discrimi-
nation. The Court held that the fourteenth amendment protects resident
aliens. They said of the fourteenth amendment: "[tlhese provisions are
universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial juris-
diction without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of na-
tionality .... ,,79 One must note, however, that it was not the fourth
amendment protection which was afforded to Yick Wo through the
fourteenth amendment. Rather, his claim was one based strictly on equal
protection through the fourteenth amendment itself.
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court tacked on several other
Constitutional protections which are afforded to aliens within the ter-
ritory of the United States. First amendment rights of resident aliens
were recognized in Bridges v. Wixon. ° The Court recognized in Kwong
Hai Chew v. Colding" I a resident alien's right to protection from dep-
rivation of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law
77. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643. 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.
Ct. 3405 (1984).
78. 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064 (1886). (Yick Wo was a subject of the Chinese
Emperor living in the United States. He operated a cleaning business here for 22 years.
He challenged a San Francisco ordinance which required laundry houses to be made of
brick or stone as discriminatory under the fourteenth amendment.).
79. Id. at 369, 6 S. Ct. at 1070.
80. 326 U.S. 135, 148, 65 S. Ct. 1443, 1449. ("Freedom of speech and of press is
accorded aliens residing in this country.").
81. 344 U.S. 590, 73 S. Ct. 472 (1953). (Petitioner, considered a resident alien,
challenged a detention by immigration officials as a violation of the fifth amendment.
The Court held that an alien lawfully in the United States is a person within the protection
of the fifth amendment.).
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under the fifth amendment. Then, in Wong Wing v. United States,8"
the court reiterated the application of the fifth amendment to resident
aliens and further added that anyone within the territory of the United
States may also invoke the sixth amendment to challenge actions of the
federal government. The older Supreme Court jurisprudence, however,
never specifically addressed whether aliens in the United States have
fourth amendment rights.
The more recent cases which address the issue of applicability of
Constitutional protections to aliens within the United States territory
have been in accord with the older jurisprudence. In the case of Mathews
v. Diaz,83 decided in 1976, the Supreme Court was confronted with a
resident alien's claim that a requirement of residency in the United States
for five years before he could claim Social Security benefits, was dis-
criminatory and a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Although the Court held that Congress could restrict an alien's right
to receive all the benefits of full citizens, it expressly held that aliens
nonetheless did have the protections of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments. The Court said:
[t]here are literally millions of aliens within the United States.
The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment,
protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.
84
In the 1982 Supreme Court decision of Plyler v. Doe, 5 the Court
again held the fourteenth amendment applicable to aliens within the
United States. Here, under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, aliens were held to have just as much of a right to public
education as United States citizens did. As with the older cases, the
newer jurisprudence has not addressed the issue of the right of aliens
in the United States to fourth amendment protection.
Supreme Court cases dealing with the applicability of the Consti-
tution to resident aliens are relatively few in number, but on the whole
consistently grant protections to resident aliens. Strikingly, however, none
specifically state that the protection of the fourth amendment applies
to resident aliens. The Court had the opportunity in 1971 to hear a
court of appeals decision which expressly stated that "aliens in this
82. 163 U.S. 228, 16 S. Ct. 977 (1896). (Petitioner challenged a Congressional act
which provided that a Chinese person, adjudicated by justice, judge, or commissioner to
be in the United States unlawfully, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for a year and then
deported. The Court held that this act violated petitioner's fifth and sixth amendment
rights to indictment by grand jury and trial by jury.).
83. 426 U.S. 67, 96 S. Ct. 1883 (1976).
84. Id. at 77, 96 S. Ct. at 1890.
85. 457 U.S. 202, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
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country are sheltered by the Fourth Amendment.. .... " but it denied
certiorari.
The only Supreme Court case which approaches the issue of ap-
plicability of the fourth amendment to aliens located within the United
States is Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza,' 7
decided in 1984. In Lopez-Mendoza, the petitioner was illegally arrested
by Immigration and Naturalization Service officials and evidence was
obtained in the arrest. Petitioner then objected to the use of the illegally
obtained evidence in his subsequent deportation hearing as a violation
of his fourth amendment rights. The Supreme Court held that depor.
tation hearings are not appropriate proceedings in which to apply the
exclusionary rule."8 However, the Court stated at the end of the opinion:
[wle do not condone any violations of the Fourth Amendment
that may have occurred ... [olur conclusions concerning the
Exclusionary Rule's value might change if there developed good
reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by INS
officers were widespread. 9
This language was interpreted by lower courts to mean that the
fourth amendment applies to illegal aliens in the United States.9 How-
ever, the Supreme Court in Verdugo held that this interpretation of
Lopez-Mendoza Was understandable but erroneous. The majority said
that the holding in Lopez-Mendoza "was limited to whether the Fourth
Amendment's Exclusionary Rule should be extended to civil deportation
proceedings; it did not encompass whether the protections of the Fourth
Amendment extend to illegal aliens in this country." 9' Therefore, the
Supreme Court clearly stated that the question of whether illegal aliens
in the United States have fourth amendment rights is unanswered. One
can speculate, however, from the trend set by the Verdugo decision and
the implications therein that the answer will be that illegal aliens in the
United States certainly do not have full, if they in fact have any, fourth
amendment rights. This proposition .is further strengthened by the fact
that the Verdugo court could have distinguished Lopez-Mendoza on the
factual ground that in Lopez, the contested search took place in the
United States, whereas in Verdugo the search took place in Mexico, but
86. Au Yi Lau v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 445 F.2d
217, 223 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864, 92 S. Ct. 64 (1971).
87. 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984).
88. Id. at 1051, 104 S. Ct. at 3489.
89. Id., 104 S. Ct. at 3489.
90. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1988). "We
find support for the proposition that illegal aliens have fourth amendment rights from
statements which appear in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza."
91. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1064 (1990).
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it did not. Rather it vehemently discredited the assumption that everyone
within United States territory has fourth amendment rights.
Although lower courts have readily assumed that legal aliens in this
country have fourth amendment rights,9 the Verdugo decision may also
threaten this assumption. If one takes the Social Compact theorists'
view, 93 as the Supreme Court in Verdugo did, then it can be contended
that an alien located in the United States is not one of "the people"
who is a party to the Social Compact; thus, he is not afforded fourth
amendment protection. The decision in United States v. Verdugo-Ur-
quidez may have the effect of not only withholding fourth amendment
protections from aliens outside the United States, but also withholding
these protections from aliens located within the United States, both
legally and illegally.
C. Applicability of the Fourth Amendment to United States Citizens
Outside United States Territory
The next logical question is whether Constitutional protections extend
to United States citizens when they leave the United States. Historically,
the Court took a strict territoriality view:9 the Constitution did not
apply outside the United States. This view was posited by the Supreme
Court in the 1891 decision of Ross v. McIntyre.9 1 In Ross, the petitioner
was appealing his conviction in Japan, by a United States tribunal, for
a murder which occurred on a United States ship harbored in Japan.
He argued that he was denied his Constitutional rights to trial by jury
and indictment by grand jury.9 The Court denied Ross these rights,
holding that the guarantees of the Constitution "apply only to citizens
and others within the United States," and that the "Constitution can
have no operation in another country. ' 97
Only ten years later, the Court again was confronted with the issue
of whether the Constitution applied to United States citizens outside of
the United States borders, in a series of decisions known as the Insular
Cases.98 In these cases, the Court held that the rights to grand jury
indictments and trial by jury, which are guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,
extend only to United States citizens within states incorporated into the
Union of the United States, but not to citizens in territories under
92. Au Yi Lau v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 445 F.2d
217 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
93. Note, supra note 25.
94. Note, 72 Va. L. Rev. 649, supra note 32.
95. 140 U.S. 453, I1 S. Ct. 897 (1891).
96. Id. at 462, 11 S. Ct. at 899.
97. Id. at 464, 11 S. Ct. at 900.
98. See supra note 51.
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United States control. However, fundamental rights extend to wherever
United States power is exerted. Ross and the Insular Cases are powerful
precedent because they stand for an important general proposition: "not
that the Constitution 'does not apply' overseas, but that there are
provisions in the Constitution which do not necessarily apply in all
circumstances in every foreign place.""9 Furthermore, these cases have
not been overruled.1°°
The strict territoriality view of the applicability of Constitutional
rights to United States citizens abroad as found in Ross and the Insular
Cases was weakened, however, by a statement of the Supreme Court
in the 1936 decision of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Cor-
poration.'0' The Court stated, "[n]either the Constitution, nor the laws
passed in pursuance of it, have any force in foreign territory unless in
respect of our own citizens .... ,,,2 Thus, one could glean a statement
of the Court which said, in essence, in respect to our own citizens, the
Constitution and laws passed in pursuance of it have force in foreign
territories.
Strict territoriality was further modified to an uncertain extent by
the Warren Court's 1957 holding in Reid v. Covert. °3 Reid involved
the trial of Mrs. Covert, a United States citizen living with her husband,
a member of the Air Force, on a United States air base in England.
Although not military personnel, she was tried by a court-martial for
the murder of her husband, pursuant to the Code of Military Justice.
The Supreme Court in a plurality opinion held that non-military wives
could not be denied the right to civilian jury trials for capital offenses,
at least not in time of peace.10 Thus, in essence, the Reid court granted
United States citizens abroad fifth and sixth amendment rights. The
plurality in Reid dismissed Ross as a "relic" from the past and distin-
guished the Insular Cases as cases involving the power of Congress to
regulate, temporarily, newly acquired territories with "wholly dissimilar
traditions and institutions .... ,,o From the outset, the Court in Reid
rejected "the idea that when the United States acts against citizens
abroad it [could] do so free of the Bill of Rights."'0 Though Reid was
99. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74, 77 S. Ct. 1222, 1260 (1957) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
100. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1067 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
101. 299 U.S. 304, 57 S. Ct. 216 (1936).
102. Id. at 318, 57 S. Ct. at 220.
103. 354 U.S. I, 77 S. Ct. 1222 (1957).
104. Id. at 39-41, 77 S. Ct. at 124243.
105. Id. at 12-14, 77 S. Ct. at 1228-29. (To further show its distaste for Ross and
the Insular Cases, Justice Black for the plurality wrote: "[mioreover, it is our judgment
that neither the[se] cases nor their reasoning should be given any further expansion.").
106. Id. at 5, 77 S. Ct. at 1225.
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only a plurality decision, reading that opinion along with language from
Curtiss-Wright, Americans could safely assume that they were now pro-
tected by the fourth amendment as they traveled abroad.
The holding of the Supreme Court in Verdugo-Urquidez, however,
also impacted this category of fourth amendment application, that is,
the application of the fourth amendment to United States citizens outside
of United States territory, by limiting the holding in Reid. The Verdugo
Court held that Reid does not stand for the sweeping proposition that
federal officials are constrained by the fourth amendment wherever and
against whomever they act. 10 It limited Reid to holding only that "United
States citizens stationed abroad could invoke the protection of the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments." 1 08 The Verdugo Court further noted that the
concurring justices in Reid refused to hold that in overseas criminal
prosecutions United States citizens have the right to the full range of
Constitutional protection. It is this writer's opinion that the Verdugo
Court's emphatic limitation on the plurality holding in Reid and pro-
nounced emphasis on the even narrower concurring opinions therein are
subtle hints by the Court that fourth amendment protection to United
States citizens abroad is at least not co-extensive with what is available
in United States territory, and at most, is arguably non-existent. Thus,
as Americans travel abroad, they must at least be aware that fourth
amendment protection against search and seizure violations by United
States officials may not follow them in their travels.
D. Applicability of the Fourth Amendment to Aliens Outside of
United States Territory
We can now look at the final category of fourth amendment ap-
plication. Does the fourth amendment apply to United States officials'
search and seizure of non-resident aliens outside of United States ter-
ritory? This issue was the exact one faced by the Supreme Court in
Verdugo. Until the Verdugo decision, this issue was res nova at the
Supreme Court level and unresolved among the circuits.1 9 One 1950
Supreme Court decision, Johnson v. Eisentrager,"10 approached the issue
107. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1063 (1990).
108. Id.
109. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 1988). The
court said:
Strangely enough, this question has not yet been answered by the Supreme
Court or definitely resolved by any Circuit Court of Appeals. Indeed, until this
case, we have been content simply to assume that the Fourth Amendment
constrains the manner in which the Federal Government may pursue its extra-
territorial law enforcement objectives. (emphasis added).
110. 339 U.S. 763, 70 S. Ct. 936 (1950).
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of a non-resident alien's Constitutional rights abroad, but is not of
much help because it is readily distinguishable upon its facts.
In Johnson, the Supreme Court denied alien enemy soldiers the fifth
amendment rights to writs of habeas corpus, although they were im-
prisoned by the United States Army in Germany after conviction of
war crimes by a United States military tribunal."' Johnson seems to
lend support to the proposition that Constitutional protections, especially
those of the fourth amendment, do not apply to non-resident aliens
abroad. However, such argument is easily rebutted by claiming that in
Johnson, it was the status of the petitioners as enemy, not alien, which
resulted in their deprivation of fifth amendment protection."' Therefore,
although the Court in Verdugo cited Johnson as support"' for the
proposition that non-resident aliens abroad have no fourth amendment
protection, it did so briefly and did not use Johnson as a basis for its
decision.
The Court in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez did supply an
answer for this category of fourth amendment application. The Court
clearly refused to give Verdugo, a non-resident alien located outside of
United States territory, fourth amendment protections. Whether or not
this decision will develop into a general rule that non-resident aliens
have no fourth amendment protections, or will evolve into a fact specific
holding, is yet to be seen. However, in a recent decision the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the same court who decided the Verdugo
decision at the appellate level, cited the Supreme Court's version of
Verdugo for the proposition that "[tihe Fourth Amendment does not
apply to a search of aliens conducted in foreign territory."" 4 This seems
to imply that at least the Ninth Circuit reads Verdugo as establishing
11. Id., 70 S. Ct. at 936.
112. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1074 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Refuting the plurality's use of Johnson as support, Brennan said:
The majority mischaracterizes Johnson v. Eisentrager (citation omitted) as hiving
"rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside
the sovereign territory of the United States. . . .' [Actually] [tihe Court [in
Johnson] rejected the German Naturalists' efforts to obtain writs of habeas
corpus not because they were foreign Naturals, but because they were enemy
soldiers.
113. Id. at 1063.
114. United States v. Aikens, 912 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1990). This case involved the
search and seizure of a Panamanian freighter in international waters by the United States
Coast Guard, United States Customs officials, and the DEA. The boat was suspected of
carrying large quantities of marijuana and when searched, 21,000 pounds of marijuana
were found. Documents and personal effects of the crew were seized. Petitioners sought
to have this evidence suppressed because their fourth amendment rights had been violated.
The Court cited Verdugo for the proposition that the fourth amendment does not apply
to a search of aliens conducted in foreign territories, and consequently found, therefore,
that no fourth amendment violation could have occurred in this case.
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a general rule that aliens.outside the United States territory have no
fourth amendment rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Verdugo decision is a strong indication that application of the
fourth amendment, other than to United States citizens in the United
States, is a very uncertain topic. The decision, though dangerous because
of its implications and indications, is relatively weak as precedent. It is
dangerous in that it answered only a small issue of extra-territorial
application of the fourth amendment, but reopened for debate several
large issues which strike even closer to home. The Court's decision,
without a doubt, opens the issue of whether illegal aliens in the United
States have fourth amendment protections by its comment on the holding
of Lopez-Mendoza,"5 a comment which the Court in fact did not have
to make." 6
One may cite Verdugo for the proposition that the issue of illegal
aliens' fourth amendment rights in the United States is res nova, and
using the Court's Social Impact Theory can conclude that they are not
among "the people" to whom the fourth amendment applies. Further,
the Court's holding in Verdugo leaves open to debate the question of
whether citizens abroad are entitled to fourth amendment protections."'
By limiting Reid to granting only fifth and sixth amendment rights to
citizens abroad, the Court implies that the fourth amendment may not
follow United States citizens in their extra-territorial travels.
A third implication one can glean from the Court's opinion is that
aliens lawfully in the United States may not have full fourth amendment
rights. Though the Court had previously always assumed that aliens in
the United States have fourth amendment rights, the Court in Verdugo
made clear that such antecedent assumptions are not binding on sub-
sequent courts. Though such a proposition seems far-fetched, a strict
reading of the case points to no Supreme Court decision which grants
aliens in the United States fourth amendment rights. Though many times
the Court has used fourth amendment analysis for protection of aliens
in the United States, such assumptions of protection are not binding.
Therefore, the Verdugo decision is not dangerous because of its limited
holding; it is dangerous for what it clearly does not hold. It is further
dangerous because it implies that when dealing with aliens in the United
115. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
116. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1068 (Stevens, J., concurring) (In a footnote
to his opinion, Justice Stevens aptly made the point that the plurality's comment on
illegal aliens' entitlement to the fourth amendment was not necessary to resolve this case,
and because of such, he refused to join the Court's "sweeping opinion.").
117. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
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States or abroad, or with United States citizens abroad, United States
law enforcement officers may not have any fourth amendment restraints.
Conversely, Verdugo may also prove to be very fact specific. The
Court knew about the torture/murder of Camarena Salazar, and the
problems United States law enforcement officials face in their efforts
to control drug traffic in this country. Therefore, one must ask if perhaps
the Verdugo case is a specific exception to a general rule not yet created,
one that provides that all have fourth amendment rights unless provided
otherwise. Would the Court's decision have been the same if Verdugo-
Urquidez were accused of extortion or some other non-violent crime
and United States officials had abducted him from his homeland and
searched his house without authorization by a neutral magistrate?
The Court is further asking for legislative help for a problem which
has serious consequences no matter how it is decided. The Court at the
end of its opinion suggested that change must come through the political
branches."' The political branches must heed this warning lest a line of
precedent evolve restricting people's freedom from government intrusion.
In fact, the Court should not suggest that a Constitutional protection
be regulated by Congress. This is a matter of Constitutional interpretation
and should remain exclusively in judicial control. Perhaps the Court
could decide cases such as Verdugo as an exception to Constitutional
guarantees during a time of war, a "war against drugs!""19 Whichever
branch of government chooses to create the policy must do so clearly
and quickly. With such uncertainty in such an important field of rights,
citizens and aliens alike are uncertain as to what rights against search
and seizure, if any, they have.
Mark Andrew Marionneaux
118. See supra text accompanying note 59.
119. Using a "War Against Drugs" approach, the Court could gain support from
Johnson v. Eisentrager's holding that enemy aliens located outside the United States are
not protected by the fourth amendment. This approach would, at least, not erode the
fourth amendment protections to the extent decisions such as Verdugo-Urquidez will.
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